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TRANSGENDERED EMPLOYEES AND THE
HETERONORMATIVE “UNIFORM”
Uniform: (n) The distinctive clothing worn by members of the same organization or body
or by children attending certain schools
(adj.) not changing in form or character; remaining the same in all cases and at all times
I

Introduction
The employment relationship involves a negotiation of images and perceptions.

In the first instance, there is the employer. The employer is sometimes an individual,
sometimes a group of individuals, sometimes a concentration of financial interests, but in
any case, it projects and promotes a uniform identity. McDonalds. Bank of America.
Main Street Dry Cleaning. Each entity makes a series of choices that shape its collective
identity. Of course, that identity necessarily includes within it a workforce comprised of
the separate and distinct identities of various individuals. The employee must suppress
her1 individual identity at least to the extent that the latter deviates from the will of the
employer. For example, although the concessionist at the local corporate movie theater
might dislike ruby red vests, she had better wear the vest if she wishes to continue
working at the theater.

If she refuses, management can justifiably terminate her,

assuming her employment is “at-will.”
This essay explores the interplay of the employer’s “uniform” ideal with certain
specific categories of employees who either knowingly deviate from that uniform or
vainly struggle to find a place within it. In particular, this essay will examine how
1

This note will use “she,” “her,” etc. in gender-neutral hypothetical scenarios such as this one. This should
not be read to imply anything about the gender or gender identity of the person in the hypothetical unless
expressly noted.

employment discrimination law protects certain individuals from suffering adverse
employment conditions where the employer’s pursuit of uniformity has encroached on
individual freedoms. Critical to obtaining a clear picture of transgendered employees in
the workplace is an understanding of the history of employment discrimination law,
particularly with respect to sex discrimination.
Under “at-will” employment, an employer is free to terminate employees “for a
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.”2 The employment-at-will regime protects
employers from incurring civil liability upon terminating employees who “don’t fit in” in
most cases. If, however, the given employee “doesn’t fit in because she’s black” or a
woman or a Mormon, the employer has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19643 and, in all likelihood, a similar state antidiscrimination law,4 thereby subjecting the
employer to liability. In effect, Title VII made “race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin” elements of the uniform workforce identity that the employer is not permitted to
shape unless the characteristic is a “bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ]
reasonably necessary to the operation of that particular business or enterprise.”5
Employers are rarely successful when asserting BFOQs as a defense, particularly when
asserted with respect to race or sex.6
“Sex” has proven itself the knottiest, most heavily disputed Title VII category. In
one sense, the problem appears deceptively simple.

Discrimination because of sex

2

William R. Corbett. The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our
Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153, 166 (2007).
3
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
4
As of this year, 20 states and the District of Columbia have laws that protect gay, lesbian and bisexual
employees in the workplace and twelve states extend workplace protections to transgendered employees.
Vivian Berger, Half a Loaf is Worse, Broward Daily Bus. Rev. 5, Vol. 48, Iss. 244 (Nov. 26, 2007).
5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
6
Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement
for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 743-44 (2003).
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happens when an employer treats men and women differently.

Returning to the

concessionists, if a movie theater manager terminates female concessionists who fail to
wear their mandatory ruby red vest without terminating male concessionists guilty of the
same violation, the manager has discriminated because of sex. The shaky assumption
implicit in the above example is that “men” and “women” are categories that are always
manifestly distinct, a postulate referred to as the “gender binary.”7 Many legal scholars
doubt whether the gender binary is an accurate and useful framework from which a court
should evaluate “sex discrimination” claims, although this approach has not gained
substantial momentum in the courts.8

It is beyond dispute, however, that “sex

discrimination” under Title VII is broad enough to include claims that arise from “gender
atypicality.”9 For example, where an employee “doesn’t fit in because she’s a lesbian” or
“doesn’t fit in because she’s intersex,” the employer can use either of these bases to
justify the termination without violating federal law; however, these latter justifications
may lose their protected status if the employer has acted on the basis of how she believes
a man or woman should behave.10
Consistent with the employers’ goals of promoting uniformity, employers are
permitted to impose control over how an employee presents herself at work, both by
requiring a work uniform and by establishing “grooming standards” for its employees.
Courts have generally upheld an employer’s right and ability to impose grooming

7

Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law's Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 83 (2006).
8
See eg., Id.
9
Deborah Zalesne, Lessons From Equal Opportunity Harasser Doctrine: Challenging Sex-Specific
Appearance And Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 535, 557 (2007).
10
See eg., James G. O’Keefe, Smith v. City of Salem and the Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1101, 1113 (2007).
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standards. For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company11, the plaintiff
bartender had worked for the defendant employer for nearly twenty years before the
employer fired her for failing to conform to the company’s new “grooming standards,”
which required female servers to wear makeup in a distinct way, and required male
servers to maintain short haircuts and refrain from wearing makeup.12 Finding for the
employer, the court held that such standards did not constitute sex discrimination under
Title VII as long as they imposed an equal burden on men and women, an implicit
validation of the gender binary.13 In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,14 the First
Circuit upheld a similar employer grooming code against a challenge that its policy
against eyebrow-piercing discriminated against the plaintiff employee’s religion, the
church of body modification.15
Similar to grooming codes is the phenomenon of “appearance discrimination.”
On its face, Title VII does not protect an employee who “doesn’t fit in because she’s fat”
or “doesn’t fit in because she’s ugly,” however, either of these justifications could
conceivably form the basis of a claim when coupled with a protected characteristic. In
other words, although firing an employee because she is ugly might be acceptable, firing
an employee because she is an ugly woman likely violates Title VII, especially if there is
evidence that the employment of men within the company is not equally as contingent on
attractiveness.16

11

Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1079.
13
Id. at 1081, 1083.
14
Cloutier v. Costco Whoesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
15
Id. at 134.
16
See Corbett, supra note 2, at 166.
12
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The employer’s desire and ability to control how its staff looks while at work
derives from its prerogative to maintain a “uniform” identity. In addition to cleanliness,
hygiene, and glossy apparel, the employer more often than not has a desire to promote the
image that its employees are gender conformists, a wish that is at odds with the
experiences and identities of transgendered employees.
II

BACKGROUND
A.

“Sex” Discrimination, Title VII, and ENDA

Title VII discrimination claims must be evaluated under a framework established
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.17 A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by demonstrating that: 1) he or she is a member of a protected
class; 2) he or she is competent to perform the job or is performing duties satisfactorily;
3) he or she suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and 4) the decision or
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based
on the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class.18
The legislative record does not reveal any floor discussion of the “because . . . of
sex” provision, primarily because it was added at the eleventh hour.19 Title VII had been
predominantly a statute about ending racial discrimination; the addition of “sex” as a
protected characteristic was a failed effort by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia,
who opposed the bill and ultimately voted against it, to derail the legislation. 20 Although
there was no substantive discussion of what sorts of things would fall under the umbrella

17

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
See eg., Dawson v. Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 215 (2nd Cir. 2005) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802).
19
The Harvard Law Review Association, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1167 (1971).
20
Id.
18
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of “sex discrimination,” similar language had been used in prior legislation. The year
before the Civil Rights Act passed, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act,
adding a provision to prevent gender discrimination in the payment of wages with the
following statutory language: “No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . on the basis of sex
by paying wages . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex.”21 Accordingly, every circuit court that has addressed the specific issue
has stated that transgendered employees are not a “class” under Title VII for purposes of
sex discrimination.22

Traditionally, courts have held that the statute protects

discrimination against “women because they are women and against men because they
are men.”23
Over the past sixteen years, several Congresspersons have proposed legislation
that would provide protection against employment discrimination for transgendered
employees, lesbian and gay employees, bisexual employees, or all of these.24 In 1995,
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), introduced by the late Senator
Edward Kennedy, came within one vote of passing in the United States Senate.25 The bill
would have protected lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) employees from
workplace discrimination if it had passed in both chambers of Congress and been signed

21

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphasis added).
See eg., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Title VII is not so
expansive as to prohibit discrimination against transsexuals.”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080
(7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended the term “sex” to mean “biological male or biological female.”); see
also Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Ettsity v. Utah, 502 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
23
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
24
Meredith R. Palmer, Finding Common Ground: How Inclusive Language Can Account For The Diversity
Of Sexual Minority Populations In The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 873,
888 (2009).
25
Id.
22
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into law.26 Instead, it has been a constant struggle for LGBT advocates who have been
attempting to achieve such protection since that bill failed.27 To wit, some form of
ENDA has been introduced by a Congressperson in every subsequent session of
Congress, with the exception of the 109th Congress28 (a body that was popularly derided
as a “do-nothing Congress” 29). Nevertheless, none of these bills attained sufficient votes
in either chamber until September 2007.30
ENDA finally received enough votes to pass in the House by a 235-184 vote, but
the bill provided no protection for transgendered employees. 31 When Rep. Barney Frank
of Massachusetts had introduced an earlier incarnation of the bill, it had included
protection for transgendered individuals, but that provision was eliminated before being
submitted for a vote.32 Rep. Frank eliminated the transgendered provision when a Whip
count had revealed that ENDA would fail if it included that provision, due to a lack of
support among members of Congress.33
There was an immense public outcry in the LGBT community when it was
revealed that ENDA no longer protected transgendered employees from discrimination.34
Proponents of the transgendered provision then introduced a second bill that would
prohibit employment discrimination based on gender identity.35

The Education and

Labor subcommittee conducted hearings on the subject of transgender discrimination in
26

Id.
Id.
28
Id. at 888-89.
29
See Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas Mann, Our Do-Nothing Congress: Little Has Been Accomplished,
Too Much Will Be Left Hanging, and What Was Done Was Done Badly, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 27,
2006.
30
Palmer, supra note 24, at 889.
31
H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
32
Sara Lubbes & Libby George, CQ Bill Analysis, Congressional Quarterly 2008 WLNR 2798852 (Feb. 9,
2008).
33
Id.
34
Palmer, supra note 24, at 889.
35
H.R. 3686 110th Cong. (2007).
27
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the workplace in the summer of 2008, during which Diane Schroer testified.36 Schroer
was currently the plaintiff in a high-profile lawsuit against the Library of Congress for
discriminating against her on the basis of ‘sex,” when it rescinded its offer of
employment upon learning that she was transgendered and planned on undergoing sex
reassignment surgery.37
Nevertheless, ENDA died in the Senate; and the House bill that included
protection for transgendered employees never came up for a vote in either chamber. 38
Currently, a House version of ENDA, which includes protection for transgendered
workers, is once again percolating in the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee.39 Its future, once again, is uncertain. While the 2007 version of ENDA that
passed the House had the support of 35 House Republicans, the 202 co-sponsors of the
2010 version of ENDA include only one Republican congressman.40 What has happened
-- or, more appropriately, failed to happen -- in Congress is reflective of a reluctance of
many

Americans

to

accept

transgendered

individuals

into

the

mainstream.

Transgendered individuals still face widespread discrimination and prejudice in several
areas in addition to employment -- from “ credit, public accommodations, and law
enforcement to more private areas such as marriage, parenting, healthcare, and
inheritance.”41 As long as transgendered individuals are forced out of other areas of
mainstream society, they will not be a part of the employer’s idealized workplace and

36

House Education Subcommittee Reviews Workplace Transgender Discrimination, U.S. Fed. News (HT
Syndication) 2008 WLNR 12174648 (June 27, 2008).
37
Id.
38
Palmer, supra note 24, at 889.
39
H.R. 3017 111th Cong. (2010).
40
GOP Support for Gay Rights Measure Slips, Roll Call (USA), Apr. 27, 2010 WLNR 8628446.
41
Demoya R. Gordon, TRANSGENDER LEGAL ADVOCACY: WHAT DO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES HAVE TO
OFFER?, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1719 (2009).
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will likely suffer the added indignity of having their struggles ignored by the federal
government.
B.

“Sex Discrimination” in the Courts

With Congress reluctant to expand or define the contours of actionable “sex
discrimination,” this has left the judiciary in the position of deciding what constitutes
actionable “sex discrimination” under the statute. One of the most radical changes in
judicial interpretation of sex discrimination under Title VII occurred in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins.42 In Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm decided not to promote Hopkins,
a female candidate for partnership, and the evidence suggested that part of the reason she
was passed over was because her personality was adjudged too aggressive and abrasive
for a woman, notwithstanding whether these characteristics would be desirable in a male
candidate.43

Thus, Hopkins’ challenge to Price Waterhouse’s employment decision

represented a challenge to its uniform ideal, one in which men were powerful dealmakers
and women were subservient, attractive, and ultimately powerless pawns in the corporate
hierarchy.
The Supreme Court held that Price Waterhouse’s conduct constituted sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII. 44 Writing for the plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan wrote, “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women
out of this bind.”45 Moreover, the Court held that “remarks based on sex stereotypes . . .

42

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 231.
44
Id. at 251.
45
Id.
43
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can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an employment decision in such a
way that violates Title VII.46
In the immediate aftermath of Price Waterhouse, some courts had held that its
loosely defined gender-nonconformity doctrine only applied to opposite-sex Title VII
claims, and not claims based on same-sex discrimination.47 In Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that same-sex
discrimination could form the predicate of a Title VII sex discrimination claim.48 “The
critical issue,” Justice Scalia opined for the majority, “is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed.”49
The federal courts soon cited Price Waterhouse and Oncale in advancing the
gender-nonconformity line of cases.

In Nichols v. Azteca, a plaintiff waiter with

effeminate tendencies brought suit against his employer, a restaurant whose employees,
including supervisors, constantly derided him by referring to him as “faggot,” “she,” and
far more vulgar expressions.50 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Nichols that “the holding in
Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for
acting too feminine.”51 Likewise, in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., the 1st
Circuit held:
Just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men
discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped
expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence
46

Id.
See eg., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F.Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
48
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523, U.S. 75 (1998).
49
Id. at 80.
50
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2001).
51
Id. at 874.
47
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that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet
stereotypical expectations of masculinity.52
As the gender-nonconformity doctrine grew in force, it became simultaneously
apparent that gay and lesbian plaintiffs could not use the doctrine to “bootstrap protection
for sexual orientation into Title VII.”53

The reason why Price Waterhouse sex

stereotyping claims could not be applied to gay and lesbian plaintiffs, as explained by the
Second Circuit, was “because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and
not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine.”54 Thus, while an employer may
construct for itself an identity that activity excludes gays and lesbians, the employer is
prohibited from doing so in a way that appeals to sex stereotypes.
What society deems culturally “feminine” and culturally “masculine” is
necessarily premised on a “stereotype,” a social determination regarding which gender
preferences or characteristics are conventionally associated with biological males and
females.55

These culturally assigned characteristics and preferences encompass

everything from “physical appearance to clothing and self-presentation, to personality
and attitude . . . to patterns of speech and behavior.”56
These cultural stereotypes dominate mainstream conceptions of gender, which in
turn inform the ideological perspectives of American employers. The importance of the
Price Waterhouse decision was that it circumscribed the extent to which employers may
rely on stereotypes that permeate society in making employment decisions.

The

importance of Price Waterhouse to the federal courts, such as the Sixth Circuit in Salem,

52

Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).
Simonton v. Runyon, 292 F.3d 33, 38 (2nd Cir. 2000).
54
Id.
55
Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2007).
56
Id.
53
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was the radical notion that judges may look beyond the simplest applications of Title VII.
Indeed, judges can apply the statute in situations where the employer’s desire to shape the
workplace in conformity with mainstream stereotypes frustrates the autonomy of the
employees who constitute that workplace.

III

RESTRICTIONS ON “APPEARANCE” AT WORK
A.

Transgendered Discrimination in Smith v. City of Salem

With gays and lesbians lacking standing to sue under Title VII and “gendernonconforming” plaintiffs uniquely situated for bringing employment discrimination
lawsuits as long as they were the victims of sex stereotyping, where does that leave
transgendered employees?
As alluded to earlier, transgendered individuals, like gay and lesbian individuals,
are not a protected “class” under Title VII.

57

Nevertheless, in the wake of Price

Waterhouse, the gender-nonconformity doctrine provided transgendered plaintiffs with
an avenue to pursue Title VII claims.

A transgendered plaintiff finally got that

opportunity in Smith v. City of Salem.58 In that case, Smith had worked for the fire
department for nearly seven years before he was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder
and hence began “expressing a more feminine appearance” at work.59 Smith’s coworkers
told him that he was not acting “masculine enough” and Smith afterwards complained to
a supervisor, who shortly thereafter made arrangements with other city officials to have

57

See eg., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Title VII is not so
expansive as to prohibit discrimination against transsexuals.”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080
(7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended the term “sex” to mean “biological male or biological female.”); see
also Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Ettsity v. Utah, 502 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
58
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
59
Id. at 567.
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Smith terminated.60 The Sixth Circuit reiterated that transgendered was still not a Title
VII class, but nevertheless held that Smith had successfully stated a valid Title VII claim,
under Price Waterhouse, by alleging that sex stereotyping about how a man should act
“was the driving force” behind the Department’s suspension of Smith.61 Thus, for the
Sixth Circuit, the employer lacked the power to shape identity and impose uniformity
when it came to dictating how men behave as men or, for that matter, as women.
B.

Grooming Codes, Stereotypes, and Appearance Discrimination

Growing out of and, to some extent, away from the gender-nonconformity line of
cases are a series of cases related to “grooming standards” and dress codes in the
workplace. The most pivotal current “grooming standards” case is Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co.62 In Jespersen, the plaintiff bartender had worked for the defendant
employer for nearly twenty years before the employer fired her for failing to conform to
the company’s new “grooming standards.63

Under these grooming guidelines, “All

beverage servers were required to be ‘well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and
body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified
uniform.’”64 Furthermore, “[f]emale beverage servers were required to wear stockings
and colored nail polish, and they were required to wear their hair ‘teased, curled, or
styled,’” while “[m]ale beverage servers were prohibited from wearing makeup or
colored nail polish, and they were required to maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed
fingernails.”65

60

Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 574-75.
62
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
63
Id.
64
Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
65
Id.
61
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A three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment
on behalf of the defendant casino.66 On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit came up
with an intermediate holding, ruling for the employer, but carving out a space for future
plaintiffs to bring sex stereotyping claims arising from grooming requirements.67
Specifically, the court held that “appearance standards, including makeup requirements,
may well be the subject of a Title VII claim for sexual stereotyping,” but that Jespersen
had failed to provide sufficient evidence either that the burdens imposed by the policy
were unequal or that the policy itself “require[d] Jespersen to conform to a stereotypical
image that would objectively impede her ability to perform her job requirements as a
bartender.”68
Thus, the Ninth Circuit elevates the importance of weighing relative burdens
experienced by each sex. Recall from the introduction of this essay that Title VII
prohibits the movie theater manager from firing the female concessionists who fail to
wear the ruby red vest unless she also terminates the male concessionists who do the
same. Jespersen stands for the proposition that the manager actually can do just that, as
long as it is consistent with a company grooming code and as long as wearing the vest is
not considered a burden as compared to wearing a different uniform and vice versa.
In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,69 the First Circuit explored the interplay
between grooming standards and religious discrimination.

For claims of religious

discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that a bona
fide religious practice conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for

66

Id.
Id. at 1079.
68
Id.
69
Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 126.
67
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an adverse employment action.70 The burden then shifts to the employer to show that it
offered a reasonable accommodation or, if it did not offer an accommodation, that doing
so would have resulted in undue hardship for the employer.71 The plaintiff in Cloutier
was terminated for wearing eyebrow rings in contravention of the company’s “no-facialjewelry” policy, an action that the plaintiff claimed violated her right to practice her
religious beliefs as a member of the Church of Body Modification.72 The First Circuit
did not have to address whether the plaintiff met her burden of making a prima facie
claim of religious discrimination, because, the court held, the imposition on the
company’s “good grooming regulations” was destructive to defendant Costco’s “public
image” and thus constituted an undue hardship.73
In Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C.,74 the Eighth Circuit held that a
defendant hotel chain committed actionable sex discrimination under Title VII where the
record reflected that the hotel fired the employee because her appearance -- short,
“tomboyish” haircut and a lack of makeup -- did not match the stereotypically feminine
“midwestern girl” look, which the employer desired in a front desk employee. 75 The
court rejected the legal conclusion made by the district court below, which had cited
Jespersen for the proposition that sex stereotyping claims required “comparative
evidence,” i.e. affirmative evidence that one group (women, e.g.) were treated worse than
another group (men, e.g.).76 The court found instead that a plaintiff could support a sex
stereotyping claim under Title VII by proffering comparative evidence, evidence of
70

Id.
Id. at 134.
72
Id. at 127.
73
Id. at 136-37
74
Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
75
Id. at 1035.
76
Id. at 1037-38.
71
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“remarks that reflect a discriminatory attitude,” or any other evidence that would “permit
a reasonable inference of discrimination.”77
Related to, but distinct from, grooming code restrictions is the concept of
“appearance discrimination.” In Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., a supervisor instructed a
female sales manager to terminate a female sales associate and “get somebody hot.”78
This is an example of sexual attractiveness as an element of the heteronormative work
uniform. When the manager refused the supervisor’s request, she herself was terminated.
The employee plaintiff had stated a valid retaliation action by alleging that she was
terminated for a refusal to comply with an order that she believed to be discriminatory. 79
Standing somewhat in contrast to this case is Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers,
Inc..80 In Goodman, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld dismissal of an obese
man’s ADA suit against weight loss company who wouldn’t hire him as a sales
counselor, adding in dicta:
[I]t is well established that an employer is permitted to make hiring decisions
based on certain physical characteristics. The mere fact that Defendant was aware
of Plaintiff's weight and rejected his application for fear that his appearance did
not accord with the company image is not improper. To hold otherwise would
render an employer's ability to hire based on certain physical characteristics
entirely void.81
Goodman demonstrates that it the employer may permissibly extend the “work uniform”
over which she has control to include the employee’s own physical body.
Commentator Jane M. Siegel addresses the issues of physical body requirements
as well as grooming restrictions with respect to women in particular and concluded that

77

Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1030.
79
Id. at 1034.
80
Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1455.
81
Id. at *7.
78
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such rules and restrictions implicate society’s obsession with women’s clothing. 82 The
fixation on women’s clothes itself relates to the recurrent desire in Western civilization to
diminish the power of women, Siegel writes, by characterizing them only according to
their appearance, because of the outdated, but still pervasive notion that “women are their
bodies.”83 Thus, the employer, catering to dominant social norms, grafts an idealized
image onto its personnel, and the distinctions between body and dress become fused in a
hegemonic work uniform.
C.

Intersex Employees and “Body” Discrimination

The most obvious instance where the work uniform interacts with an employee’s
actual physical body occurs in instances where an individual has suffered workplace
discrimination on the basis of being intersexed. “Intersexuals” is a term that refers to a
“congenital anomaly of the reproductive and sexual system.”84 There are a wide variety

82

Jane M. Siegel, Thank You, Sarah Palin, for Reminding Us: It’s Not About the Clothes, 17 Va. J. Soc.
Pol’y & L. 144, 152 (2009).
83
Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028 (2005).
84
Emi Koyama, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J. L. AND MED. 41 (2004).
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of different physical conditions that result in an individual being classified as “intersex”85
and it is estimated that there are millions of Americans who are intersex.86
Only one reported case, Wood v. C.G. Studios, has addressed whether intersexuals
are entitled to protection from employment discrimination on the basis of “sex” when
they are discriminated against for being intersexuals.87 Although this Pennsylvania case
was based on the commonwealth’s own employment discrimination statute as opposed to
Title VII, the court cited the Title VII transsexual cases as support for its holding that
intersexuals were not protected by the statute.88 The plaintiff in Wood brought a claim
against her former employer, alleging that the reason she was terminated was because her
defendant employer found out that she had undergone “gender-corrective surgery” to
“correct her hermaphroditic condition” at some point previous to her employment with
the defendant. The court held that under the plain meaning of the Pennsylvania statute,
the law was intended to bring about “equality between the sexes,” and that terminating an
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employee who had undergone gender-corrective surgery did not constitute discrimination
because of “sex.”89
The problem, which the Wood case brings to the forefront, is that, as commentator
Julie Greenberg’s compendium of the scientific research indicates, “sex,” even in the
anatomical sense, is a fluid concept that is sometimes difficult to categorize. Bearing this
in mind, how could a court arrive at the result that sex discrimination laws are about
achieving “equality between the [two] sexes,” when an honest scientific evaluation of the
gender binary renders this approach immensely underinclusive.
D.

Schroer v. Billington

In Schroer v. Billington, the District Court for the District of Columbia addressed
an employment discrimination claim by a male-to-female transsexual plaintiff.90 The
plaintiff, Diane Schroer, born David Schroer, had achieved great success as a highly
decorated member of the United States military for 25 years, though during that time she
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria.91 Schroer applied for a position at the Library of
Congress, while appearing as a man during the interview.92 After she was offered the
position by a representative of the Library, Schroer revealed her gender dysphoria and her
intention to undergo sex reassignment surgery and fulfill the position as a woman.93
After revealing this information, the offer of employment with the Library was
rescinded.94 Schroer then brought a Title VII action against the Library, claiming
discrimination on the basis of sex.95
89
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When it first addressed the Schroer claim on a motion to dismiss, the District
Court of D.C. rejected Schroer’s contention that his claim was “sex stereotyping” under
Price Waterhouse.96 Judge Robertson opined that the Price Waterhouse holding was
“considerably more narrow than its sweeping language suggests.”97 The court added that
Price Waterhouse was limited to the “Catch-22” cases where it could be shown that men
or women were suffering adverse consequences regardless of how they chose to represent
themselves from a gender standpoint.98
When it said, ‘[I] n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes,’ the Court
meant no more than that: disparate treatment of men and women by sex
stereotype violates Title VII. Adverse action taken on the basis of an employer's
gender stereotype that does not impose unequal burdens on men and women or
disadvantage one or the other does not state a claim under Title VII.99
The court nevertheless rejected a motion to dismiss so that a more robust factual record
could be developed with regards to another theory, namely that “discrimination against
transsexuals because they are transsexuals is ‘literally’ discrimination ‘because of . . .
sex.’”100 Specifically, the court requested scientific testimony as to the “basis for sexual
identity in general, and gender dysphoria in particular.”101
Curiously, after the factual record was further developed, the court ruled in favor
of Schroer, while simultaneously holding that it was not competent to decide the
scientific issue the court itself had posed, because the testimony of the experts on both
sides was “impressive.” 102 The court arrived at this result, by holding that it did not need
96
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to reach the scientific issue, partially by looking to the plain language of the statute103 and
partially because it held that the Library had engaged in impermissible sex stereotyping
under Price Waterhouse.104 With respect to the latter holding, the court distanced itself
from the Jespersen disparate treatment approach it had employed in Schroer I, holding
that such a showing was not required where there was direct evidence of stereotyping as
in the present case.105 Judge Robertson wrote, “I do not think that it matters for purposes
of Title VII liability whether the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it
perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine
woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual,” because in any event the
factual record supplied evidence of sex stereotyping.106
D. What Schroer and Jespersen Mean to Transgendered Employees
Schroer stands in stark contrast to Jespersen and its ilk. Although the latter
reaches its very different result through a very different set of legal gymnastics, Jespersen
seems to supply employers with a foolproof guide to discriminate against transgendered
employees and still steer clear of a court that may be taking a Schroer-like approach. The
expansive language of Schroer aside, an employer can easily establish a policy that
actively discriminates against transgendered employees by requiring men to wear a
certain uniform and women to wear a different uniform. In a sense, then, Jespersen
represents the stubborn persistence of the gender binary, silently thwarting the efforts of
transgendered individuals, intersex individuals, and other advocates who would desire to
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see gender liberated from the hegemonic uniformity imposed by employers that reflect
mainstream prejudices.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The employer owns the image that it projects to society through its employees,

but that does not mean that it may control every aspect of that image. It is already
forbidden for an employer to actively project an image of all males or all whites in the
employees it hires, as it is forbidden for the employer to control its workforce’s gender
behavior by telling women how to be women or men how to be men. The next logical
steps in this scheme are: 1) for courts to follow the examples of Salem and Schroer in
admitting that transgendered individuals also have the right to protection under Title VII;
2) to dismantle the gentle binary in recognizing that intersex individuals can state a cause
of action for sex discrimination; and 3) to recognize sex-differentiated grooming
standards for what they are: the employer’s coded tools, used to perpetuate a stereotypical
image that obfuscates the truth in the service of a false uniformity.
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